Joe Nocera, NY Times

I’m talking about that odd 13-page “report” issued on Wednesday by the four Republican members of theFinancial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The F.C.I.C., of course, is the 10-member, supposedly bipartisan panel that was created by Congress last year and charged with examining the root causes of the financial crisis.

After a year and a half of hearings, including questioning over 800 witnesses, reviewing millions of pages of documents, and spending some $6 million in taxpayers’ money, its final report is due to be delivered in a month.

Except that in Washington these days, there is no such thing as bipartisan. On every major issue facing the country, Democrats and Republicans have competing narratives. Why should anyone expect anything different when it comes to the origins of the financial crisis?

Although commission members had long made a show of trying to work collaboratively, there was always a fair amount of underlying tension. Some of that tension had to do with the internal dynamics of the commission — the general sense of chaos, for instance, and the supposedly autocratic style of its Democratic chairman, Phil Angelides.

But more recently, it has had to do with the growing tug of war between the commissioners over which financial crisis narrative would win out. The Republican minority, fearing their view would get short shrift, pre-emptively put forward a CliffsNotes version of their theory of the case. In other words, they responded to a report that hasn’t even yet been written, much less read and voted on by the members.

Is there such a word as “presponse?” Perhaps we should coin it to describe what took place this week at the F.C.I.C.

It would all be pretty laughable if it didn’t have serious consequences. But it does. First, with the commission’s Republican members having now issued this public, partisan smoke signal, the final product, no matter how rigorous, will be inevitably dismissed as a Democratic document. As a result, it will have little impact and, once Bill O’Reilly has finished mocking it, will be consigned to the dustbin of history. By creating this partisan rift, the Republicans have succeeded in tarring the entire enterprise.

That is a genuine shame. When the commission was formed last year, there were high hopes that it could act as a modern-day Pecora investigation — which rooted out Wall Street corruption in the wake of the crash of 1929, and helped create the political groundswell for such key reforms as the Glass-Steagall Act. That investigation was led by Ferdinand Pecora, who held the country spellbound through some two years of nonstop investigations. Clearly, this effort isn’t going to come close to that one.

“I think we can officially stop comparing these guys to the Pecora Committee,” said Michael Perino, author of an engaging recent book about Pecora, “The Hellhound of Wall Street.” Mr. Perino added, “It is disparaging to Pecora.”

The second consequence is even more important. Next year, the House of Representatives will be in Republican hands. High on the agenda for the new majority is its own version of financial reform. The Republicans hope to minimize the impact of the Dodd-Frank bill while at the same attacking — and fixing — what they see as the “true” culprit of the financial crisis.

To fix a problem, though, it helps to know what the problem is. The F.C.I.C., with all those witnesses and documents, could have really helped here. But the paper released by the commission’s Republicans this week reads as if they couldn’t be bothered. It simply reiterates longstanding Republican dogma that could have been written without a $6 million investigation. None of which bodes particularly well for the next two years of “financial reform.”

The problem the Republicans want to fix is the two government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Without question, Fannie and Freddie need fixing. A week beforeLehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, both entities were so troubled that they had to be taken over by the federal government. Since then, the G.S.E.’s, as they’re called in Washington, have cost the taxpayer around $150 billion in losses, far more than, say, the American International Group.

They have also, though, served a critical purpose. With the private mortgage market essentially broken, virtually every mortgage made in America, postcrisis, has required a guarantee from Fannie, Freddie or the Federal Housing Administration. With the banks unwilling to make mortgage loans on their own, you simply cannot buy a house in America today without Fannie and Freddie’s help.

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