JPMorgan Chase Blows Away Analysts’ Estimates, Lies Beyond Expectations

Martin Andelman, ML-Implode

Last Thursday, I woke up extra early to hear Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase lie through his teeth about his mega-bank’s quarterly earnings.  Analysts were expecting a lie of around 70 cents a share, but Mr. Dimon exceeded all expectations for lying, reporting earnings of $1.09 a share.  Now, to be fair, some of that was made up of one-time items, and some of it was just plain made up.  But even so, taking away the one-time events, JPMorgan Chase would have reported earnings of 87 cents a share.  Fabulous, isn’t he?  And handsome too.

To be entirely honest about the whole thing, it made me queasy for half an hour or so, and I had to get up and walk around.  I didn’t need a part time job last week, I had more than enough on my plate as it was.  And here was Dimon telling me I would soon have to spend a good six hours trying to figure out how to separate the wheat from the bank’s chaff.

I know what you’re thinking… “Oh, goodie… an accounting article… I just love these.”  Yeah, well don’t worry, their not exactly my favorite kind to write either, but this one’s important.

JPMorgan Chase’s earnings report was all sunshine and flowers, the bank reported a drop in net revenue of 8%, which was in line with what Wall Street was expecting.  But the bank’s investment banking and fixed income securities trading, both fell in Q2, as compared with Q1.  So, where did all that money come from that allowed JPMorgan Chase to report such astonishing quarterly results?

It’s really quite simple… Dimon took $1.5 billion out of the bank’s account that’s labeled “reserves for future losses,” which is obviously supposed to be there in anticipation of future losses on bad loans, and called it “profits,” by taking it to the bottom line.  Nice, huh?  Losses… hmmm… now why on earth would anyone worry about losses at JPMorgan Chase at a time like this?

Actually, the whole thing was confusing because Dimon also cautioned analysts that the bank’s “losses from bad loans remain elevated.”

But, I suppose as long as Geithner doesn’t make the mega-bank write down any losses in the future, everything will work out just fine and dandy.  What, me worry?  No chance of that.  Besides, I don’t know why anyone would have a hard time believing anything a bank said these days.  I mean, these guys wouldn’t lie, right?  Flourish the thought.

Read more here: http://mandelman.ml-implode.com/2010/07/jpmorgan-chase-blows-away-analysts’-estimates-lies-beyond-expectations/

Share

Do You Have Any Reforms in Size XL?

Gretchen Morgenson, NY Times

EVERY once in a while, Congress awakens from its lobbyist-induced torpor, realizes that the masses are cranky and sets out to appease them. Such a moment occurred last week when lawmakers finally got the message that Main Street is disgusted with Wall Street and wants them to do something about it.

Financial reform, which had been stumbling along, suddenly got traction. Bills and proposals began flying around Capitol Hill, andPresident Obama chided the bankers in an appearance in New York.

Unfortunately, the leading proposals would do little to cure the epidemic unleashed on American taxpayers by the lords of finance and their bailout partners. The central problem is that neither the Senate nor House bills would chop down big banks to a more manageable and less threatening size. The bills also don’t eliminate the prospect of future bailouts of interconnected and powerful companies.

Too big to fail is alive and well, alas. Indeed, several aspects of the legislative proposals sanction and codify the special status conferred on institutions that are seen as systemically important. Instead of reducing the number of behemoth firms assigned this special status, the bills would encourage smaller companies to grow large and dangerous so that they, too, could have a seat at the bailout buffet.

Here’s an example of this special treatment: Both bills would establish a specific process to resolve big-bank failures. Smaller institutions, by contrast, would be allowed to go bankrupt without a new resolution scheme.

This special resolution system is not only unfair; it also sends a pernicious signal to the market about large and intertwined institutions. The message is this: Subject as they will be to a newly codified “resolution authority,” these institutions and their investors and lenders can expect to be rescued if they get into trouble.

This perception delivers lucrative advantages to these institutions. The main perquisite is lower borrowing costs, a result of lenders’ assumptions that the giants are less risky because they will be in line for government assistance if they become imperiled. ThinkFannie Mae and Freddie Mac. And remember all those folks on Capitol Hill and elsewhere who assured taxpayers that we would never lose a dime on those companies?

It is disappointing that none of the current proposals call for breaking up institutions that are now too big or on their way there. Such is the view of Richard W. Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

“The social costs associated with these big financial institutions are much greater than any benefits they may provide,” Mr. Fisher said in an interview last week. “We need to find some international convention to limit their size.”

Read more here: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/business/economy/25gret.html

Share

How $50 Billion in TARP Money Is Being Spent on Housing

By Nick Timiraos, Wall Street Journal

The Obama administration is stressing that the revamp of its foreclosure prevention efforts won’t cost any more taxpayer money.
That’s because the administration hasn’t come close to using the $50 billion from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that it set aside for its loan modification program last year.

That money helps cover the cost of lowering borrowers’ monthly payments, usually by reducing interest rates and extending loan terms to 40 years. Loan servicers that handle mortgage payments also receive incentive payments for successfully modifying mortgages under the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP. Borrowers are eligible for payments after one year in the program.

Separately, the administration said last week it would begin requiring banks to consider writing down loan balances for borrowers who owe 115% of their home value. Lenders will receive 10 to 21 cents of federal subsidies for every dollar of loan principal reduced, depending on the degree to which the borrower is underwater.

HAMP has resulted in just 170,000 permanent modifications so far and is being revamped to reach more borrowers. That means the $50 billion outlay from TARP has essentially become a housing slush fund that doesn’t require congressional approval for every new outlay or program change.

Here’s a look at where some of the money is going:

http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2010/03/30/how-50-billion-in-tarp-money-is-being-spent-on-housing/?mod=e2tw

Share

No More Welfare For Wall Street

Detroit Free Press Editorial
If you screw up, you’re going down.

That’s the one message Wall Street should receive from any financial reform measures that Congress undertakes. The other essential is better protection and education for consumers when they deal with a system that thrives by offloading risk onto them and/or all taxpayers.
The U.S. House has already produced a tepid regulatory bill. Earlier this month, on the heels of a report that Lehman Bros. had earned its 2008 demise, Sen. ChrisDodd, D-Conn., moved an only slightly stronger version to the Senate floor.

The report on Lehman Bros., detailing the shell game it played with assets and the growing risks it assumed, serves as an excellent reminder of how warped the entire U.S. financial system had become before it fell apart in 2008, wreaking havoc throughout the economy and requiring taxpayers to pick up the pieces.
To their credit, the banks have repaid a lot of the taxpayer money they received, although they also have benefited mightily from Federal Reserve policies that kept them afloat but are more difficult to put a dollar figure on. Meantime, even though an entire TeaParty movement took hold on the thought that mere mortgage holders might be bailed out, little aid has flowed to the people caught on the other side of the risk-laden transactions that sparked the crisis.

Weak as the bills in play are, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has already vowed to fight the creation of a consumer protection agency. There’s plenty of reason for everyone to be skeptical of the increased oversight that would be vested in the Federal Reserve, given the way it got blindsided by the 2008 downturn.

No matter what regulations are put in place, financial institutions will surely find the gaps that let them make money with their quantitative mathematical magic. That’s why taxpayers need assurance that any downside from those financial risks rebounds solely on the institutions that take them.

Anything else is simply welfare for Wall Street.

Share