John Flannery, James Hopkins, Ex-State Street Employees, Charged In Subprime Case

Candace Choi, AP via Huffington Post

The Securities and Exchange Commission on Thursday charged two former employees of State Street Bank & Trust Co. with misleading investors about their exposure to subprime investments.

The SEC said John Flannery and James Hopkins marketed the company’s Limited Duration Bond Fund as an alternative to a money market fund. But by 2007, the SEC said that fund was almost entirely invested in subprime mortgage-backed securities and derivatives.

In an e-mailed statement, State Street said it has already resolved the matter with clients and that it would “not comment on the SEC’s separate investigations into individuals who are no longer with the firm.”

An attorney for Hopkins, who the SEC said was employed with State Street until Wednesday, said his client is “proud of his distinguished 34-year career built on personal integrity” and expects to be exonerated.

An attorney for Flannery said his client acted in good faith during his employment as chief investment officer with the company.

The charges against Flannery and Hopkins come after State Street agreed earlier this year to settle a case with the SEC and state regulators involving the same fund. Under the terms of that settlement, State Street repaid investors more than $300 million. The 270 or so investors to be repaid included nonprofits, religious institutions and retirement funds.

According to the latest case, Flannery and Hopkins played an instrumental role in drafting a series of misleading communications about the fund starting in July 2007.

The SEC says the company gave internal advisers more information about the Limited Duration Bond Fund’s subprime investments. Those advisers then recommended their clients, including the pension plan of parent company State Street Corp., to get out early.

The SEC’s order seeks a ban that would prevent Flannery and Hopkins from being employed in the future with an investment company. The order also seeks an unspecified civil penalty.

Read more here: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/30/john-flannery-james-hopki_n_745666.html

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Cleaning up the mortgage mess

Sally Apgar, Real Deal

South Florida gave the country the setting for the fictional crime-fighting television series “CSI-Miami,” and now it’s giving the United States a real force for combating mortgage fraud.

For more than a year, Stephen Dibert and his company, MFI-Miami, have investigated mortgage fraud on behalf of homeowners facing losing their homes in Florida, where mortgage corruption and foreclosure rates count among the highest in the nation. Statewide success has inspired Dibert to expand, but there’s plenty of work still left here.

“The hyper appreciation Florida experienced during the boom attracted a lot of people who flocked to Florida and are now starving,” Dibert said.

According to the Mortgage Fraud Research Institute, Florida was the capital of mortgage fraud in 2006, 2007 and for the first quarter of 2008, after which Rhode Island surpassed its rate.

On the criminal side, the U.S. Attorney’s office in Miami created a mortgage fraud task force in September 2007. Since then, the Southern District of Florida has charged 236 individuals in cases involving approximately $271.5 million in fraudulent loans.

Dibert’s MFI-Miami, which he said is a play on the name of the popular TV series “CSI:Miami,” specializes in mortgage fraud investigations and forensic audits on behalf of attorneys representing homeowners facing foreclosure.

The Boynton Beach-based firm and its sister companies MFI-Boston, MFI-DC and MFI-New York search for inaccuracies, inconsistencies and outright fraud in mortgage documents — usually involving at least 70 documents per homeowner case. It’s a symptom of the layered complexities of the mortgage market collapse, and it can sometimes work to the advantage of a borrower in trouble.

Irregularities in foreclosure cases can give homeowners a negotiating edge with a lender. Dibert said in some cases, an analysis of how a loan has been traded in the secondary market can raise enough questions about the loan’s current ownership to knock down the legal standing of the lender suing to foreclose.

Nick Steffan, a Coral Gables attorney who has worked with MFI-Miami, said that the irregularities investigators find give him the ammunition to negotiate with a lender to slow a foreclosure or even modify the loan. He said such information arms him against large lenders “who have a strategy to strike hard and foreclose and take everything as fast as they can.”

Now that MFI-Miami has been studying mortgages at the consumer level — the microeconomics level of understanding the mortgage default crisis — the problems are moving to an institutional level.

“We want to take our investigation a step further to the meat and potatoes of where this fraud went on and that’s Wall Street,” said Dibert.

Dibert said he hopes his work uncovers some of what he calls Wall Street’s financial shell games in the mortgage securitization process through investigations of pooling and servicing agreements, the layers of financial trading that helped create the mortgage bubble in the early 2000s. While most homeowners in mortgage trouble know their original lenders very well, the slicing and dicing of loans on the secondary market often create a tangled paper trail.

He also said the contents of the certificate that a trustee alleges contain an actual, specific mortgage are ripe fodder for his work.

MFI-Miami will try to uncover if the certificate was part of a credit default swap that may have been paid as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, or by a third party. Dibert said such analysis could determine whether the lender can legitimately enforce the terms of a homeowner’s mortgage or if the lender or trustee is committing securities fraud.

“I’m very excited about starting this new service,” said Dibert. “Not only will we be able to prove or disprove the legitimacy of any claims made by the lender, but we’ll also be able to determine if the lender is trying to collect from the homeowner after already being paid with TARP funds.”

http://therealdeal.com/miami/articles/cleaning-up-the-mortgage-mess-by-combating-mortgage-fraud

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Did Merrill Lynch Create A Ponzi Scheme with CDOs?

Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis

Jake Bernstein and Jesse Eisinger, ProPublica
Over the last two years of the housing bubble, Wall Street bankers perpetrated one of the greatest episodes of self-dealing in financial history.

Faced with increasing difficulty in selling the mortgage-backed securities that had been among their most lucrative products, the banks hit on a solution that preserved their quarterly earnings and huge bonuses:

They created fake demand.

A ProPublica analysis shows for the first time the extent to which banks — primarily Merrill Lynch, but also Citigroup, UBS and others — bought their own products and cranked up an assembly line that otherwise should have flagged.

The products they were buying and selling were at the heart of the 2008 meltdown — collections of mortgage bonds known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs.

As the housing boom began to slow in mid-2006, investors became skittish about the riskier parts of those investments. So the banks created — and ultimately provided most of the money for — new CDOs. Those new CDOs bought the hard-to-sell pieces of the original CDOs. The result was a daisy chain that solved one problem but created another: Each new CDO had its own risky pieces. Banks created yet other CDOs to buy those.

Individual instances of these questionable trades have been reported before, but ProPublica’s investigation, done in partnership with NPR’s Planet Money, shows that by late 2006 they became a common industry practice.

An analysis by research firm Thetica Systems, commissioned by ProPublica, shows that in the last years of the boom, CDOs had become the dominant purchaser of key, risky parts of other CDOs, largely replacing real investors like pension funds. By 2007, 67 percent of those slices were bought by other CDOs, up from 36 percent just three years earlier. The banks often orchestrated these purchases. In the last two years of the boom, nearly half of all CDOs sponsored by market leader Merrill Lynch bought significant portions of other Merrill CDOs.

ProPublica also found 85 instances during 2006 and 2007 in which two CDOs bought pieces of each other’s unsold inventory. These trades, which involved $107 billion worth of CDOs, underscore the extent to which the market lacked real buyers. Often the CDOs that swapped purchases closed within days of each other, the analysis shows.

There were supposed to be protections against this sort of abuse. While banks provided the blueprint for the CDOs and marketed them, they typically selected independent managers who chose the specific bonds to go inside them. The managers had a legal obligation to do what was best for the CDO. They were paid by the CDO, not the bank, and were supposed to serve as a bulwark against self-dealing by the banks, which had the fullest understanding of the complex and lightly regulated mortgage bonds.

It rarely worked out that way. The managers were beholden to the banks that sent them the business. On a billion-dollar deal, managers could earn a million dollars in fees, with little risk. Some small firms did several billion dollars of CDOs in a matter of months.

“All these banks for years were spawning trading partners,” says a former executive from Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, a major insurer of the CDO market. “You don’t have a trading partner? Create one.”

Read more here: http://www.propublica.org/article/banks-self-dealing-super-charged-financial-crisis

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Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes Be Foreclosure-Proof?

The financial juggling that helped cause the 2008 crisis may be coming back to haunt banks—and help homeowners.

Ellen Brown, Yes! Magazine

Over 62 million mortgages are now held in the name of MERS, an electronic recording system devised by and for the convenience of the mortgage industry. A California bankruptcy court, following landmark cases in other jurisdictions, recently held that this electronic shortcut makes it impossible for banks to establish their ownership of property titles—and therefore to foreclose on mortgaged properties. The logical result could be 62 million homes that are foreclosure-proof.

Mortgages bundled into securities were a favorite investment of speculators at the height of the financial bubble leading up to the crash of 2008. The securities changed hands frequently, and the companies profiting from mortgage payments were often not the same parties that negotiated the loans. At the heart of this disconnect was the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, a company that serves as the mortgagee of record for lenders, allowing properties to change hands without the necessity of recording each transfer.

MERS was convenient for the mortgage industry, but courts are now questioning the impact of all of this financial juggling when it comes to mortgage ownership. To foreclose on real property, the plaintiff must be able to establish the chain of title entitling it to relief. But MERS has acknowledged, and recent cases have held, that MERS is a mere “nominee”–an entity appointed by the true owner simply for the purpose of holding property in order to facilitate transactions. Recent court opinions stress that this defect is not just a procedural but is a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff’s legal ability to foreclose.

That means hordes of victims of predatory lending could end up owning their homes free and clear — while the financial industry could end up skewered on its own sword.

California Precedent

The latest of these court decisions came down in California on May 20, 2010, in a bankruptcy case called In re Walker, Case no. 10-21656-E-11. The court held that MERS could not foreclose because it was a mere nominee; and that as a result, plaintiff Citibank could not collect on its claim. The judge opined:

Since no evidence of MERS’ ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another.Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.

In support, the judge cited In Re Vargas (California Bankruptcy Court); Landmark v. Kesler (Kansas Supreme Court); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy (a New York case); and In Re Foreclosure Cases (the “Boyko” decision from Ohio Federal Court). (For more on these earlier cases, see here, here and here.) The court concluded:

Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case.

The broad impact the case could have on California foreclosures is suggested by attorney Jeff Barnes, who writes:

This opinion . . . serves as a legal basis to challenge any foreclosure in California based on a MERS assignment; to seek to void any MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust or the note to a third party for purposes of foreclosure; and should be sufficient for a borrower to not only obtain a TRO [temporary restraining order] against a Trustee’s Sale, but also a Preliminary Injunction barring any sale pending any litigation filed by the borrower challenging a foreclosure based on a MERS assignment. While not binding on courts in other jurisdictions, the ruling could serve as persuasive precedent there as well, because the court cited non-bankruptcy cases related to the lack of authority of MERS, and because the opinion is consistent with prior rulings in Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue.

What Could This Mean for Homeowners?

Earlier cases focused on the inability of MERS to produce a promissory note or assignment establishing that it was entitled to relief, but most courts have considered this a mere procedural defect and continue to look the other way on MERS’ technical lack of standing to sue. The more recent cases, however, are looking at something more serious. If MERS is not the title holder of properties held in its name, the chain of title has been broken, and no one may have standing to sue. In MERS v. Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, MERS insisted that it had no actionable interest in title, and the court agreed.

An August 2010 article in Mother Jones titled “Fannie and Freddie’s Foreclosure Barons” exposes a widespread practice of “foreclosure mills” in backdating assignments after foreclosures have been filed. Not only is this perjury, a prosecutable offense, but if MERS was never the title holder, there is nothing to assign. The defaulting homeowners could wind up with free and clear title.

In Jacksonville, Florida, legal aid attorney April Charney has been using the missing-note argument ever since she first identified that weakness in the lenders’ case in 2004. Five years later, she says, some of the homeowners she’s helped are still in their homes. According to a Huffington Post article titled “‘Produce the Note’ Movement Helps Stall Foreclosures”:

Because of the missing ownership documentation, Charney is now starting to file quiet title actions, hoping to get her homeowner clients full title to their homes (a quiet title action ‘quiets’ all other claims). Charney says she’s helped thousands of homeowners delay or prevent foreclosure, and trained thousands of lawyers across the country on how to protect homeowners and battle in court.

Criminal Charges?

Other suits go beyond merely challenging title to alleging criminal activity. On July 26, 2010, aclass action was filed in Florida seeking relief against MERS and an associated legal firm for racketeering and mail fraud. It alleges that the defendants used “the artifice of MERS to sabotage the judicial process to the detriment of borrowers;” that “to perpetuate the scheme, MERS was and is used in a way so that the average consumer, or even legal professional, can never determine who or what was or is ultimately receiving the benefits of any mortgage payments;” that the scheme depended on “the MERS artifice and the ability to generate any necessary ‘assignment’ which flowed from it;” and that “by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically ‘mail or wire fraud,’ the Defendants . . . participated in a criminal enterprise affecting interstate commerce.”

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