The mortgage blame game

Washington Post Editorial

The latest round in this blame game began on Dec. 15, when Republican members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission published an analysis blaming government subsidies for inflating the subprime mortgage bubble – to which liberals responded that Fannie and Freddie had followed, not led, Wall Street into the risky subprime business.

This is not exactly an empty debate. If Republicans can win, score one for their broader free-market views; if Democrats win, it would vindicate government intervention. We are sorry to say, however, that both sides have a point. Fannie and Freddie did not start securitizing and selling large quantities of subprime and other exotic loans until 2007 or so, by which time private-label securitizers had already sowed the seeds of disaster. The mortgage giants did, however, buy hundreds of billions of dollars worth of subprime securities for their own portfolios starting in 2003. Bottom line: Fannie and Freddie did not create the subprime boom, but they enabled it, to enrich their shareholders (and management), and to meet federal affordable-housing goals – which, by the way, had bipartisan support.

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Boiler Rooms and Foreclosure Mills: A Brief History of America’s Mortgage Industry

Michael Hudson, Huffington Post

The news about the nation’s foreclosure scandal has been coming fast and furious, fueled by tales of backdated documents, false affidavits and “rocket dockets” that push families into the street.

A former employee with one of the nation’s largest lenders testifies that he signed off on 400 foreclosure documents a day without reading them or verifying the information in them was correct.

Ex-employees of a law firm that serves as a “foreclosure mill” for major lenders describe a workplace where speed — not accuracy or justice — trumps all. “Somebody would get a 76-day foreclosure,” one recalled, “and then someone else would say, ‘Oh, I can beat that!’”

Shocking stuff. But surprising? Not for anyone who’s been tracking the recent history of the mortgage machine. Just about every corner of America’s mortgage industry has been blemished by significant levels of fraud over the past decade.
Forged Signatures, Fake W-2 Forms

On the front end of the process, for example, many mortgage pros used “boiler-room” salesmanship to peddle loans to borrowers who didn’t understand what they were getting and couldn’t afford their loans in the long run. To make these deals go through, some workers forged borrowers’ signatures on key disclosure documents, pressured real estate appraisers to inflate home values, and created fake W-2 tax forms that exaggerated loan applicants’ earnings.

At Ameriquest Mortgage, one of the companies I focus on in my new book about the subprime mortgage debacle, The Monster, this sort of cut-and-paste document production was so common employees joked that the work was being done in “The Lab” or the “Art Department.”

Here’s a snippet from the book, from a passage about Stephen Kuhn, a young Ameriquest salesman who eventually became distraught about the things he had to do to earn his living:

Read more here:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-hudson/boiler-rooms-and-foreclos_b_754299.html

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Wall Street Had ‘No Idea’ What Subprime CDSs Were, Lewis Writes

James Pressley, Bloomberg

Michael Burry, the California hedge-fund manager who figured out how to bet against the subprime bubble, prodded seven Wall Street banks in early 2005 to create credit-default swaps for subprime-mortgage bonds, Michael Lewis writes in his book, “The Big Short.”

Five of them “had no idea what he was talking about,” Lewis says. Only Deutsche Bank AG and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. expressed any interest in the concept, he says.

“Inside of three years, credit-default swaps on subprime- mortgage bonds would become a trillion-dollar market and precipitate hundreds of billions of losses inside big Wall Street firms,” Lewis writes in an excerpt from the book on the Web site of Vanity Fair magazine.

“Yet, when Michael Burry pestered the firms in the beginning of 2005, only Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs had any real interest in continuing the conversation. No one on Wall Street, as far as he could tell, saw what he was seeing.”

The book is scheduled to be published later this month by W.W. Norton in the U.S. and by Allen Lane in the U.K.

Burry, the head of Cupertino, California-based Scion Capital Group LLC, had concluded that lending standards had hit bottom, Lewis writes. He had studied subprime mortgage bonds in detail, wading through hundreds of prospectuses, Lewis says, and had figured out that the way to bet against them would be with credit-default swaps, which allow investors to insure against — or bet on — the likelihood that the issuer will default.

At the time, there was no such thing for subprime mortgage bonds, writes Lewis, a Bloomberg News columnist. So Burry had to get Wall Street banks to create one.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=ahU3.EVqKSH8

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