Secret Docs Show Foreclosure Watchdog Doesn’t Bark or Bite

Paul Kiel, ProPublica

Why has the administration’s flagship foreclosure prevention program been so ineffective in helping struggling homeowners get loan modifications and stay in their homes? One reason: The government’s supervision of the program has apparently ranged from nonexistent to weak.

Documents obtained by ProPublica—government audit reports of GMAC, the country’s fifth-largest mortgage servicer—provide the first detailed look at the program’s oversight. They show that the company operated with almost no oversight for the program’s first eight months. When auditors did finally conduct a major review more than a year into the program, they found that GMAC had seriously mishandled many loan modifications—miscalculating homeowner income in more than 80 percent of audited cases, for example. Yet, GMAC suffered no penalty. GMAC itself said it hasn’t reversed a single foreclosure as a result of a government audit.

The documents also reveal that government auditors signed off on GMAC loan-modification denials that appear to violate the program’s own rules, calling into question the rigor and competence of the reviews.

Some of the auditors’ mistakes are “appalling,” said Diane Thompson of the National Consumer Law Center, an advocacy group. “It suggests the government isn’t taking the auditing process seriously.”

In a written response to ProPublica’s questions, a spokeswoman for the Treasury Department, which runs the program, denied there were serious flaws in its oversight system, calling it “effective and unprecedented in many ways.”

The audits of GMAC, though revealing, give only a limited view into the program, because the Treasury has refused to release the documents for other servicers. For more than a year, through a Freedom of Information Act request, ProPublica has sought the audits of 10 of the largest program participants. The Treasury provided only GMAC’s audits, because the company consented to their release. ProPublica continues to seek all of the reports.

Abuses of the foreclosure process, in which banks and mortgage servicers cut corners or even created false documents to move troubled borrowers out of their homes, have been extensively documented, along with failures by government to regulate the industry. But the lapses revealed in the documents obtained by ProPublica stand out because they occurred within the government’s main effort to prevent foreclosures, the Home Affordable Modification Program.

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The U.S. Needs a Meaningful Mortgage Settlement

Simon Johnson, Bloomberg

Discussions around this weekend’s International Monetary Fund annual meetings in Washington made it clear that the standard macroeconomic toolkit has little more to offer the U.S. It’s time to try something else.

Monetary policy has reached its limits, and further fiscal stimulus isn’t in the cards. Three years into the financial crisis, the U.S. economy is still held back by weak consumer confidence. Meanwhile, the global financial system continues to face instability, most notably because of the persistent sovereign-debt crisis in Europe.

With roughly a quarter of all U.S. households with mortgages owing more on their loans than their homes are worth, it’s no surprise that consumption, which accounts for 70 percent of gross domestic product, is restrained.

The consequent lack of demand discourages business investment, which means job creation remains weak. People are afraid of losing their homes and that fear keeps spending down and thus prevents them — and their neighbors — from getting jobs.

What can be done to break this vicious circle? One suggestion from some officials this weekend — and of course many banks — is to accept a relatively small amount of money to settle the various robo-signing and other mortgage document cases that state attorneys general are pursuing. The claim is that this would put the banks back on their feet and spur lending. This is a complete illusion.

TARP Props

The biggest banks were propped up during the crisis by the Treasury Department using Troubled Asset Relief Program funds and by the Federal Reserve with huge loans in various forms. Some institutions, including Citigroup and Bank of America, were put back on their feet several times.

But this approach has proved insufficient to spur an economic recovery. Left to their devices, banks will always fail to restructure loans on a scale sufficient to make a macroeconomic difference. Negative equity or near negative equity weighs on consumers and depresses confidence, but no single private firm will ever take into account those broader consequences.

To date, the government’s efforts on mortgages have been lame — and much less than was done to save the biggest and worst managed banks. There’s also zero chance that this Congress would authorize the use of any public money to support mortgage relief. At the same time, it’s only fair and reasonable that there should be redress for homeowners who were tricked into mortgages they couldn’t afford, evicted without due process or otherwise mistreated by banks.

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Treasury To Temporarily Penalize Mortgage Companies

Shahien Nasiripour, Huffington Post

The Treasury Department will temporarily withhold payments to the nation’s three largest mortgage companies for failing to comply with the Obama administration’s signature foreclosure-prevention effort, perhaps finally making good on a 19-month-old threat, officials announced Thursday.

Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase, which collectively service about half of all home loans, abused homeowners and violated the rules of the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, Treasury said. The initiative aims to lower monthly payments, reduce loan balances or enable distressed borrowers to sell their homes before they’re seized by awarding a series of incentive payments to banks, investors and homeowners when foreclosures are averted. Treasury is only withholding pay to the three banks.

The three were found to need “substantial improvement,” the agency said in a statement. Cumulatively, they received $24 million in government incentive payments last month. Last quarter, the three financial behemoths collectively reported about $11.4 billion in net income. (Another firm came in for criticism, but it was spared the momentary financial penalty because its results were skewed due to an acquisition.)

The remaining six of the 10 largest mortgage companies that were audited were found to need “moderate improvement.” None passed with flying colors.

Bank of America, the worst performer, was found to have poor internal controls for identifying and contacting homeowners. Its error rates were also more than four times Treasury’s benchmark when calculating borrowers’ income. JPMorgan improperly calculated the incomes of nearly a third of borrowers when it was trying to determine their eligibility for the program — more than six times the limit. And Wells Fargo had poor processes for determining borrowers’ eligibility. Its income error rates were also more than five times Treasury’s max.

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Treasury Makes it Official: GSE Reform Proposal Delayed

National Mortgage News

The Treasury Department on Monday confirmed what most mortgage lobbyists have been anticipating for months — that the White House’s long-awaited report on restructuring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and the U.S. housing finance system in general) will be delayed until mid-February.

Industry officials that have served as consultants to the government said a number of GSE-related options are currently being considered by the Treasury Department such as merging (at least over the short-term) Fannie and Freddie’s MBS issuance business, and spinning off their multifamily guarantee business to the private sector.

It’s expected that the White House will present a list of GSE “options” to lawmakers and not necessarily concrete proposals.

“The delay in releasing the report suggests there may be a debate within the administration about whether to propose a specific plan or rather to summarize options,” said William Longbrake, an executive-in-residence at the University of Maryland. “The latter approach seems increasingly likely.”

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